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There has been much interest in quantum key distribution. Experimentally, quantum key distri-
bution over 150 km of commercial Telecom fibers has been successfully performed. The crucial issue
in quantum key distribution is its security. Unfortunately, all recent experiments are, in principle,
insecure due to real-life imperfections. Here, we propose a method that can for the first time make
most of those experiments secure by using essentially the same hardware. Our method is to use
decoy states to detect eavesdropping attacks. As a consequence, we have the best of both worlds—
enjoying unconditional security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics and yet dramatically
surpassing even some of the best experimental performances reported in the literature.
PACS numbers:
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users, Al-
ice and Bob, to communicate in absolute security in the
presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Unlike conventional
cryptography, the security of QKD is based on the fun-
damental laws of physics, rather than unproven compu-
tational assumptions. The security of QKD has been rig-
orously proven in a number of recent papers [1]. See also
[2]. There has been tremendous interest in experimental
QKD [3, 4], with the current world record distance of 150
km of Telecom fibers[4].
Unfortunately, all those exciting recent experiments
are, in principle, insecure due to real-life imperfections.
More concretely, highly attenuated lasers are often used
as sources. But, these sources sometimes produce signals
that contain more than one photons. Those multi-photon
signals open the door to powerful new eavesdropping at-
tacks including photon splitting attack. For example,
Eve can, in principle, measure the photon number of each
signal emitted by Alice and selectively suppress single-
photon signals. She splits multi-photon signals, keeping
one copy for herself and sending one copy to Bob. Now,
since Eve has an identical copy of what Bob possesses,
the unconditional security of QKD (in, for example, stan-
dard BB84 protocol[5]) is completely compromised.
In summary, in standard BB84 protocol, only signals
originated from single photon pulses emitted by Alice
are guaranteed to be secure. Consequently, paraphrasing
GLLP [6], the secure key generation rate (per signal state
emitted by Alice) can be shown to be given by:
S ≥ Qµ{−H2(Eµ) + Ω[1−H2(e1)]} (1)
where Qµ and Eµ are respectively the gain and quantum
bit error rate (QBER) of the signal state [7], Ω and e1 are
respectively the fraction and QBER of detection events
by Bob that have originated from single-photon signals
emitted by Alice and H2 is the binary Shannon entropy.
It is a priori very hard to obtain a good lower bound
on Ω and a good upper bound on e1. Therefore, prior
art methods (as in GLLP [6]) make the most pessimistic
assumption that all multi-photon signals emitted by Alice
will be received by Bob. For this reason, until now, it has
been widely believed that the demand for unconditional
security will severely reduce the performance of QKD
systems [6, 8, 9, 10, 11].
In this paper, we present a simple method that will pro-
vide very good bounds to Ω and e1. Consequently, our
method for the first time makes most of the long distance
QKD experiments reported in the literature uncondition-
ally secure. Our method has the advantage that it can be
implemented with essentially the current hardware. So,
unlike prior art solutions based on single-photon sources,
our method does not require daunting experimental de-
velopments. Our method is based on the decoy state idea
first proposed by Hwang [12]. While the idea of Hwang
was highly innovative, his security analysis was heuris-
tic. The key point of the decoy state idea is that Alice
prepares a set of additional states—decoy states, in ad-
dition to standard BB84 states. Those decoy states are
used for the purpose of detecting eavesdropping attacks
only, whereas the standard BB84 states are used for key
generation only. The only difference between the decoy
state and the standard BB84 states is their intensities
(i.e., their photon number distributions).
By measuring the yields and QBER of decoy states, we
will show that Alice and Bob can obtain reliable bounds
to Ω and e1, thus allowing them to surpass all prior art
results substantially [13]. Here, we give for the first time
a rigorous analysis of the security of decoy state QKD.
Moreover, we show that the decoy state idea can be com-
bined with the prior art GLLP [6] analysis.
Preliminary versions of our result in this paper have
appeared in [14, 15], where we presented not only the
general theory, but also proposed the idea of using only a
few decoy states (for example, three states—the vacuum,
a weak decoy state with µdecoy ≪ 1 and a signal state
with µ = O(1). We call this a Vacuum+Weak decoy state
2protocol). Subsequently, our protocols for decoy state
QKD have been analyzed in [16] and more systematically
in [17]. See also [18]. Recently, we have provided the first
experimental demonstration of decoy state QKD in [19].
We now present the general theory of our new decoy
state schemes. We will assume that Alice can prepare
phase-randomized coherent states and can turn her power
up and down for each signal. This may be achieved by
using standard commercial variable optical attenuators
(VOAs) [20]. Let |√µeiθ〉 denote a weak coherent state
emitted by Alice. Assuming that the phase, θ, of all
signals is totally randomized, the probability distribution
for the number of photons of the signal state follows a
Poisson distribution with some parameter µ. That is
to say that, with a probability pn = e
−µµn/n!, Alice’s
signal will have n photons. In summary, we have assumed
that Alice can prepare any Poissonian (with parameter
µ) mixture of photon number states and, moreover, Alice
can vary the parameter, µ, for each individual signal.
Let us consider the gain Qµ for a coherent state
|√µeiθ〉. [Here and thereafter, we actually mean the ran-
dom mixture of |√µeiθ〉 over all values of θ as the phase
is assumed to be totally randomized.] We have:
Qµ = Y0e
−µ + Y1e
−µµ+ Y2e
−µ
(
µ2/2
)
+ . . .+ Yne
−µ (µn/n!) + . . . (2)
where Yn is the yield of an n-photon signal [21] and where
Y0 ≥ 0 gives the detection events due to background
including dark counts and stray light from timing pulses.
Similarly, the QBER can depend on the photon num-
ber. Let us define en as the QBER of an n-photon signal.
The QBER Eµ for a coherent state |√µeiθ〉 is given by
QµEµ = Y0e
−µe0 + Y1e
−µµe1 + Y2e
−µ
(
µ2/2
)
e2
+ . . .+ Yne
−µ (µn/n!) en + . . . , (3)
which is the weighted average of the QBERs of various
photon number eigenstates.
Essence of the decoy state idea Let us imagine that a
decoy state and a signal state have the same character-
istics (wavelength, timing information, etc). Therefore,
Eve cannot distinguish a decoy state from a signal state
and the only piece of information available to Eve is the
number of photons in a signal. Therefore, the yield, Yn,
and QBER, en, can depend on only the photon number,
n, but not which distribution (decoy or signal) the state
is from. We emphasize that the essence of the decoy state
idea can be summarized by the following two equations:
Yn(signal) = Yn(decoy) = Yn (4)
en(signal) = en(decoy) = en. (5)
While a few decoy states are sufficient, for ease of dis-
cussion, we will for the moment consider the case where
Alice will pick an infinite number of possible intensities
for decoy states. Let us imagine that Alice varies over all
non-negative values of µ randomly and independently for
each signal, Alice and Bob can experimentally measure
the yield Qµ and the QBER Eµ. Since the relations be-
tween the variables Qµ’s and Yn’s and between Eµ’s and
en’s are linear, given the set of variables Qµ’s and Eµ’s
measured from their experiments, Alice and Bob can de-
duce mathematically with high confidence the variables
Yn’s and en’s. This means that Alice and Bob can con-
strain simultaneously the yields, Yn and QBER en simul-
taneously for all n. Suppose Alice and Bob know their
channel property well. Then, they know what range of
values of Yn’s and en’s is acceptable. Any attack by Eve
that will change the value of any one of the Yn’s and en’s
substantially will, in principle, be caught with high prob-
ability by our decoy state method. Therefore, in order
to avoid being detected, the eavesdropper, Eve, has very
limited options in her eavesdropping attack. In summary,
the ability for Alice and Bob to verify experimentally the
values of Yn and en’s in the decoy state method greatly
strengthens their power in detecting eavesdropping, thus
leading to a dramatic improvement in the performance
of their QKD system.
The decoy state method allows Alice and Bob to detect
deviations from the normal behavior due to eavesdrop-
ping attacks. Therefore, in what follows, we will consider
normal behavior (i.e., the case of no eavesdropping). De-
tails of QKD set-up model can be seen in [17].
Yield Let us discuss the yields, Yn’s, in a realistic
set-up.
(a) The case n = 0.
In the absence of eavesdropping, Y0 is simply given by
the background detection event rate pdark of the system.
(b) The case n ≥ 1. For n ≥ 1, yield Yn comes from
two sources, i) the detection of signal photons ηn, and
ii) the background event pdark. The combination gives,
assuming the independence of background and signal de-
tection events,
Yn = ηn + pdark − ηn · pdark
≈ ηn + pdark (6)
where in the second line we neglect the cross term because
the background rate (typically 10−5) and transmission
efficiency (typically 10−3) are both very small.
Suppose the overall transmission probability of each
photon is η. In a normal channel, it is common to as-
sume independence between the behaviors of the n pho-
tons. Therefore, the transmission efficiency for n-photon
signals ηn is given by:
ηn = 1− (1− η)n, (7)
[For a small η and ignore the dark count, Yn ≈ nη.]
QBER Let us discuss the QBERs, en’s, in a realistic
experiment.
(a) If the signal is a vacuum, Bob’s detection is due
to background including dark counts and stray light due
3to timing pulses. Assuming that the two detectors have
equal background event rates, then the output is totally
random and the error rate is 50%. That is, the QBER
for the vacuum e0 = 1/2.
(b) If the signal has n ≥ 1 photons, it also has some
error rate, say en.
More concretely, en comes from two parts, erroneous
detections and background contribution,
en = (edetector · ηn + 1
2
pdark)/Yn, (8)
where edetector is independent of n.
The values of Yn and en can be experimentally verified
by Alice and Bob using our decoy state method. Any
attempt by Eve to change them significantly will almost
always be caught.
Combining decoy state idea with GLLP Suppose key
generation is done on signal state |√µeiθ〉. In principle,
Alice and Bob can isolate the single-photon signals and
apply privacy amplification to them only. Therefore, gen-
eralizing the work in GLLP, we find Eq. (1) where the
gain of the signal state, Qµ =
∑
∞
k=0 Yke
−µ
(
µk/k!
)
, [This
comes directly from Eq. (2).] and the fraction of Bob’s
detection events that have originated from single-photon
signals emitted by Alice is given by:
Ω =
Q1
Qµ
, (9)
where
Q1 = Y1 · µe−µ (10)
is the gain for the single photon state.
The derivation of Eq. (1) assumes that error correction
protocols can achieve the fundamental (Shannon) limit.
However, practical error correction protocols are gener-
ally inefficient. As noted in [22], a simple way to take
this inefficiency into account is to introduce a function,
f(e) > 1, of the QBER, e. By doing so, we find that the
key generation rate for practical protocols is given by:
S ≥ q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)]}, (11)
where q depends on the implementation (1/2 for the
BB84 protocol, because half the time Alice and Bob bases
are not compatible, and if we use the efficient BB84 pro-
tocol [23], we can have q ≈ 1. For simplicity, we will take
q = 1 in this paper.), and f(e) is the error correction
efficiency [22].
Let us now compare our result in Eq. (11) with the
prior art GLLP result. In the prior art GLLP [6] method,
secure key generation rate is shown to be at least
S ≥ Qµ
{
−H2(Eµ) + Ω
[
1−H2(Eµ
Ω
)
]}
, (12)
where Ω, the fraction of “untagged” photons, (which is a
pessimistic estimation of the fraction of detection events
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FIG. 1: This figure is obtained by writing a simple program.
The line of GLLP without decoy state uses the formula (12)
and GLLP+Decoy uses the formula (11) according to the pa-
rameters given in experiment GYS [3]. With decoy states, the
maximal distance increases to over 140 km. For comparison,
we found that with prior art method, the secure distance is
only about 30 km. We have also proven that an upper bound
of distance of secure BB84 with the GYS parameters is 208
km because this corresponds to the point where e1 = 1/4 and
the protocol is insecure due to an intercept-resend attack. We
have checked that our results are stable to small perturbations
to the background event rate pdark and average photon num-
ber µ (both up to 20% change).
by Bob that have originated from single-photon signals
emitted by Alice), is given by
1− Ω = pmulti/Qµ, (13)
where pmulti is the probability of Alice’s emitting a multi-
photon signal. Eq. (13) represents the worst situation
where all the multi-photons emitted by Alice will be re-
ceived by Bob.
Comparing our result (given in Eq. (11)) with the
prior art GLLP result (given in Eq. (12)), we see that
the main difference is that in our result, a much better
lower bound on Ω and a much better upper bound on e1
can be obtained.
Implication of our result We obtain substantially
higher key generation rate than in [6]. In more detail,
note that, from Eq. (6), Yn for n > 2 is of similar order
to Y1. Therefore, from Eq. (11) it is now advantageous
for Alice to pick the average photon number in her signal
state to be µ = O(1). Therefore, the key generation rate
in our new method is O(η) where η is the overall trans-
mission probability of the channel. In comparison, in
prior art methods for secure QKD, µ is chosen to be of or-
der O(η), thus giving a net key generation rate of O(η2).
In summary, we have achieved a substantial increase in
net key generation rate fromO(η2) to O(η). Moreover, as
will be discussed below, our decoy state method allows
secure QKD at much longer distances than previously
thought possible.
4More concretely, we [15] have applied our results to
various experiments in the literature. The results are
shown in Fig. 1 using the GYS [3] experiment as an ex-
ample. We found that the optimal averaged number µ in
GYS that maximizes the key generation rate in our decoy
state method in Eq. (11) is, indeed, ofO(1) (roughly 0.5).
Therefore, the key generation rate is of order O(η). We
remark that the calculated optimal value of photon num-
ber of 0.5 is, in fact, higher than what experimentalists
have been using. Experimentalists often liberally pick
0.1 as a convenient number for average photon number
without any security justification. In other words, oper-
ating their equipment with the parameters proposed in
the present paper will allow experimentalists to not only
match, but also surpass their current experimental per-
formance (by having at least five-fold the current exper-
imental key generation rate). This demonstrates clearly
the power of decoy state QKD. Moreover, Fig. 1 shows
that with our decoy state idea, secure QKD can be done
at distances over 140 km with only current technology.
In summary, our result shows that we can have the best
of both worlds: Enjoy both unconditional security and
record-breaking experimental performance. The general
principle of decoy state QKD developed here can have
widespread applications in other set-ups (e.g. open-air
QKD or QKD with other photon sources) and to multi-
party quantum cryptographic protocols such as [24]. As
demonstrated clearly in [17], one can achieve almost all
the benefits of our decoy state method with only one
or two decoy states. See also [16]. Recently, we have
experimentally demonstrated decoy state QKD in [19].
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